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1. Introduction 
Dialectic between identity and otherness constitutes the distinctive 
characteristic of every multicultural society, and, of course, it should be 
clearly stated that such a dialectics defines the social dimension of the 
member states of the European Union. Actually, it is widely recognized 
that the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st 
century have seen large waves of migration from both within the EU and 
from outside it. Without any doubt, this phenomenon draws the 
attention of scholars working in the different fields of jurisprudence, 
humanities, and social sciences.  
The volumes Linguaggi del monoteismo e pace preventiva (2012) and 
Fedi, credenze, fanatismo (2016) of the book series Athanor. Semiotica, 
Filosofia, Arte, Letteratura represented a successful experiment in which 
jurists, semioticians, literary critics, social scientists, philosophers, and 
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artists have tried to give some critical insights on the codes and 
languages of monotheists religions.  
Even if every author addressed the theme from his own scientific 
perspective, a trait d’union connected all the papers: the firm belief that 
rather than being bulwarks defending isolated identities, monotheistic 
religions are intrinsically open to the otherness, that is, intrinsically 
dialogical:1 “The monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam obliges 
me to enter a discourse that unites me to the other. Logic, dialogue and 
argumentation, an accord between interlocutors, is possible, but there is 
a condition: our interlocutor must agree to listen and to reply. No 
argumentation can oblige another to enter a discourse, nor can 
Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction function if the other does not 
listen and remains silent. In the monotheistic languages of Judaism, 
Christianity  and Islam, there is a word that obliges me to enter a 
discourse that unites me to the other. Monotheism, as Levinas says, is 
not an ‘arithmetics of the Divine’. It is school of xenophilia and 
antiracism” (Ponzio, 2012a, p.12). 
In this paper, I will not directly thematize the issue of monotheistic 
religions in the contemporary societies, but, following the analyses 
developed in the mentioned volume, I would like to emphasize that 
multiculturalism is – as the word in itself suggests – a multi-dimensional 
problem, which demands to be analysed using an interdisciplinary 
approach. A propos , I would like to illustrate that such a topic – which 
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is of primary importance to the theory of law, and, particularly, to the 
research on human rights – could be framed also into a socio-semiotic 
perspective. Therefore, I would suggest a theoretical schema for the 
analysis of intercultural relations. More specifically, I will analyse the 
philosophical categories of identity and otherness, referring to the 
theories of authors which underlined the dialogic character of sign, its 
being the result of human social work, its irreducibility to every 
monoculturalism. 
 
2. Some terminological/theoretical clarifications. 
First of all, I would like to clarify some terminological choices. In the 
title of this paper I used the word “intercultural”, in place of 
“multicultural”. In doing so, I followed a distinction structured by the 
Italian jurist Mario Ricca (2008). According to Ricca, the two words 
connote two different approaches on the level of social theory, and on 
the level of democratic praxis; indeed, both the words have a descriptive 
acceptation and a prescriptive one.  
The adjective “multicultural” describes the simultaneous presence of 
different cultures in a certain territory, or in a certain communication 
process; on the prescriptive level, the term “multiculturalism” defines a 
social politics “antithetical to the mediation between cultural differences” 
(Ricca, 2008, p.8). On the contrary, the adjective “intercultural” refers to 
the inescapable fact that cultural differences condition social relations, 
and generate a cultural relativism in every contemporary society; on the 
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descriptive level – according to Ricca –, cultural relativism implies a goal-
oriented mediation, that is, the fact that social actors recognize the 
cultural values of the Other (i.e., of the stranger) with the purpose of 
realizing certain practical objectives (e.g., political or economic). From 
such a perspective, interculturality is an unaware product of the social 
interactions. When “interculturalism” becomes a “planning-word” 
(Ricca, 2008, p.9) – that is, the cornerstone on which every pluralist 
democracy should structure its “intercultural lexicon” (Ricca, 2008, p.23) 
– a common code for the communications between different cultures 
arises, and the descriptive dimension becomes wittingly the prescriptive 
one. 
From such a perspective, the constitution of an intercultural lexicon 
presupposes necessarily a translation process, and this is, actually, the 
specific difference between multiculturalist and interculturalist approach: 
the former understands cultures as untranslatable systems of knowledge; 
namely, multiculturalism affirms the impossibility of translating certain 
cultural signs systems in the corresponding signs systems of another 
culture. On the contrary, the intercultural approach maintains not only 
that cultures are translatable, but even that “translation constitutes an 
open challenge to juridical science” (Stefanì, 2012, p. 107). Having said 
that, it is clear that such a terminological distinction presupposes a 
theoretical one, of which I would like to underline certain philosophical 
and socio-semiotic implications; particularly, I would like to point out 
that multiculturalism and interculturalism presuppose two different 
philosophical logics: the logic of identity and the logic of otherness. The 
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choice of the word “intercultural” in the title of this paper expresses my 
affinity with the intercultural perspective, and with the logic of otherness: 
an affinity on the analytical-descriptive level and on the political-
prescriptive one. 
According to Ricca, multicultural model conceives the contemporary 
democracy as a mosaic in which every culture lives “in a kind of guarded 
isolation, a condition of reciprocal indifference legally guaranteed” 
(Ricca, 2008, p.14, emphasis mine). Such a coexistence is grounded in 
the abstraction of a “multicultural agreement which preserves and 
promotes cultural difference as a value in itself” (Ricca, 2008, p.11, 
emphasis mine). Such a model considers individuals as completely 
subjected to the rules of their culture, overlooking that the democratic 
subjectivity is constituted by a plurality of values: individuals are at the 
same time workers, consumers, citizens, atheists or religious, and so on. 
On the contrary, multiculturalism moves all those factors to the 
background, emphasizing the religious identity: the cultural identity of an 
individual coincides with the religion that he professes, and this is a 
typical application of the logic of identity. In the following paragraph, in 
line with the research of some experts of theory of law (Ricca, 2008; 
2012; Stefanì, 2012), I would like to point out the philosophical origin 
multicultural approach, more specifically, the fact that multiculturalism 
could be interpreted as a development of jus-naturalistic conception of 
human rights. 
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3. Human rights and multiculturalism: two aspects of the 
logic of identity 
As is well known (cf. Ponzio, 2008; Stefanì, 2012), in the essay “On the 
Jewish question” (1843), Marx prepared the ground for his critique of 
the bourgeois conception of human rights. Such a critique will be 
developed further in the Grundrisse (1857-1858), and in the first volume 
of Capital (1867). 
According to Marx, bourgeoisie forced the whole field of human 
relationships – political and juridical included – into the economic logic 
of commodities exchange; the social world is nothing else but the result 
of a convergence of different private interests between isolated 
individuals (i.e., between homines oeconomici): “equality and freedom 
are thus not only respected in exchange based on exchange values but, 
also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of 
all equality and freedom. As pure ideas they are merely the idealized 
expressions of this basis; as developed in juridical, political, social 
relations, they are merely this basis to a higher power” (Marx, 1857-
1858).  
In a few words, the equal exchange, that is, the exchange of money and 
commodities, has become the paradigm of every human relation: the 
sphere of commodities exchange, i.e., the sphere of circulation, “within 
whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in 
fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, 
Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and 
seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by their 
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own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come 
to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common 
will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a 
simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for 
equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And 
Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings 
them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the 
selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks to 
himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just 
because they do so, do they all, in accordance with the pre-established 
harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, 
work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in 
the interest of all” (Marx, 1867). 
 As the Italian scholar Augusto Ponzio maintains, in this famous 
excerpt from the first volume of Capital, Marx highlights that capitalistic 
mode of production develops in all of its manifestations a system of  
“indifferent differences” (Ponzio, 2008, p. 106), and the root of all this 
articulations is constituted by “the abstract category ‘labour,’ ‘labour as 
such,’ labour sans phrase, the point of departure of modern economics” 
(Marx, 1857); it is such an abstraction that allows commodification of 
human labour: a relation of equality associates every particular – i.e., 
different – human labour, because every particular human labour is 
equally alienable, that is, sold and bought on the labour market. 
Measuring human work in labour time, and paying it in money – the 
universal equivalent –, capitalistic mode of production makes indifferent 
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the different human labours, and such a dynamic starts on the level of 
the social division of labour: understood as individual, the single worker 
in no way differs “from the next individual and from all other individuals 
in so far as they perform equal labour” (Marx, 1859). 
On the level of theory of law, jus-naturalism constituted the driving 
force of the bourgeois conception of human rights, which culminates in 
the model of homo oeconomicus as theorized by Hobbes (cf. Stefanì, 
2012). Modern State – i.e., the bourgeois State – recognizes to its citizens 
a juridical subjectivity that coincides with their being homines 
oeconomici; as Marx affirms, the sphere of the bourgeois is passed off 
the sphere of citoyen: “None of the so-called rights of man, therefore, 
go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society – that 
is, an individual withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private 
interests and private caprice, and separated from the community. In the 
rights of man, he is far from being conceived as a species-being; on the 
contrary, species-life itself, society, appears as a framework external to 
the individuals, as a restriction of their original independence. The sole 
bond holding them together is natural necessity, need and private 
interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic selves” 
(Marx, 1844). 
 All of this theses constitute the theoretical field into which, 
nowadays, the issue of multiculturalism bursts. Jus-naturalism 
transformed categories of Christian moral and religion in cultural and 
anthropological categories, which became the foundation of western 
juridical system. As is well known (cf. Ricca, 2008; Stefanì, 2012), Hugo 
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Grotius (1583-1645) was the architect of such a juridical construction: 
first of all, he underlines that rationality of man is a direct manifestation 
of God’s will, but he affirms also that categories of natural law are valid 
etsi deus non daretur; thus, shifting the religious matrix of his categories 
in the background, Grotius theorized the laity of Modern State: it not 
only becomes independent from every confession, but it emerges also as 
the juridical and political subject with the authority to neutralize every 
religious conflict.   
To sum up, we could say that jus-naturalistic theory develops an 
Universalism in which Right is considered as completely independent 
from its social and cultural (i.e., historical) basis; furthermore, cultural 
identity of individuals is totally overlooked. Neutralizing religious (i.e., 
cultural) origin of juridical categories, the concept of culture in itself is 
neutralized. But, “irruption of multicutlurality disassembles the 
anthropological and cultural structure of society, showing how the 
Construction of Modernity is defective; multiculturality unmasks the 
pretence of the so-called modern law rationalization” (Stefanì, 2012, p. 
105). It means that the issue of cultural root of juridical categories, which 
Occidental Reason threw out from the window, it is coming back 
through the front door: nowadays, different cultures are present in 
countries of so-called Western World, and, identifying these cultures on 
the basis of a religious connotation, Occidental Reason underlines, 
actually, the religious character of its juridical framework: religion is used 
as a criterion to identify the difference of other, but, in doing so, religion 
becomes, unwittingly, the sign that distinguishes and defines the cultural 
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identity of Occidental Reason. This latter concept constitutes, if you will, 
a  continuum between jus-naturalistic conception of human rights and 
multicultural approach: indeed, as already said, we could consider 
multiculturalism as an application of the logic of identity ushered in jus-
naturalism. Nevertheless, as Ricca maintains, multiculturalism has the 
merit of developing a criticism of universalistic and individualistic model 
typical of jus-naturalism: multicultural approach was the first juridical 
theory which recognized that “cultures were entitled to the human rights, 
and subjects in need of legal protection” (Ricca, 2008, p.19). 
 
4. The socio-semiotic construction of cultural identity 
4.1. Linguistic work and ideology as semiotic product 
 
Now, before going further, it seems opportune to clarify what it should 
be understood with the world “culture”. For this purpose, I will consider 
Ferruccio Rossi-Landi’s (1921-1985) socio-semiotics as my theoretical 
focus. More specifically, I will refer to his theories on social reproduction 
(Rossi-Landi, 1985, 1992), and on work-language homology (Rossi-
Landi, 1968 [2003], 1977, 1985 [2006]). These theories seems to me 
congruent to the concept of culture as structured by the intercultural 
approach: every culture could be understood as an “encyclopaedia of 
knowledges and praxes” (Ricca, 2008, p.21); according to this thesis, 
every praxis presupposes a know-how that implies necessarily “the work 
on artefacts as much as the work on symbols” (Ricca, 2008, p.20). This 
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assumption seems being in line with concept of homology between 
linguistic and material production structured by the Italian semiotician: 
“man has never produced linguistic artefacts without producing material 
artefacts at the same time. It is only by abstraction that we place the 
former under examination without the latter […] A civilization which is 
“only material” or “only linguistic” does not exist in reality” (Rossi-
Landi, 1977, p. 70). From such a perspective, identity could be 
understood as a cultural device, i.e., a semiotic artefact generated by 
semiotic human work. In order to explain better what this latter 
assumption implies, I would like to proceed with a brief exposition of 
the most important key points of Rossi-Landi’s research. 
First of all, it should be presented Rossi-Landi definition of semiotics: 
semiotics is the general theory of non-verbal and verbal sign systems 
(Rossi-Landi, 1968 [2003]). 
 Developing a semiotic theory in the framework of Marxian 
historical materialism, Rossi-Landi maintains that social reproduction – 
i.e. “the totality of practices through which any tribe or community or 
society continues to produce itself, viz. reproduces itself, thus proceeding 
in time from generation to generation” (Rossi-Landi, 1992, p.176) – 
consists not only in processes of production, exchange and consumption 
of material artefacts, but also in processes of production, exchange and 
consumption of signs: indeed, work – understood as economic material 
production –, and language – i.e. production of non-verbal and verbal 
signs – are homologous, that is, they are “two different manifestations of 
the same structure-in-becoming” (Rossi-Landi, 1977, p. 74). Such a 
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structure-in-becoming is the mankind in itself. Therefore – in line with 
Rossi-Landi’s theory –, it seems opportune to specify that the term 
“linguistic” should refer to human language in general, that is, to the 
human ability for generating and interpreting verbal and non-verbal 
signs.2 
If, agreeing with Marx, we consider human work as zweckmässige 
Tätigkeit, i.e. an activity conforming to a goal, we have also to admit that 
work is inherently “linguistic”, because that goal is actually a sign, that is, 
“a conscious or unconscious, desired or endured, “mental” anticipation 
of the product” (Rossi-Landi, 1977, p.40); namely, a design or a 
planning. From such a perspective, language “determines the finalistic 
character of work, its taking place according to a program” (Rossi-Landi, 
1977, p.40). Programs are nothing else but organized parts of a certain 
sign system, i.e., instructions which are more or less implicit in certain 
forms of work. Thus, human work is language, because it is 
constitutively full of signs; indeed, it is necessarily based on human 
communication and communication is, at once, based on learning and 
execution of codified signs; but, on the other hand, language is work, 
because “communication is the execution of programs. Learning to 
execute the programs, one learns to communicate and become part of 
the process of “social reproduction”” (Rossi-Landi, 1977, p. 27). In 
                                                 
2 From such a perspective,  if  we accept Rossi-Landi definition of semiotics as the 
general theory of verbal and non-verbal signs,  then we could consider also the 
adjective “semiotic” as a synonym of “linguistic”. 
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other words, learning to communicate by adopting certain codified signs, 
one contributes to work involved in the construction of social world. 
Starting from these theses, Rossi-Landi develops Marx and Engels 
analysis of the relationships between structure and superstructure, 
affirming that ideology is not necessarily false consciousness, but rather 
social design, i.e., “the general framework within which all the programs 
of the society must fit” (Rossi-Landi, 1992, p.17) constituted by the 
totality of programs through which a social group requires its members 
to answer with certain behaviours to certain signs. Nevertheless, signs 
are not simply behavioural norms; indeed, every sign involves an 
individual or social interpretation; and since ideology is made of signs, 
and every sign can be interpreted, this entails that every ideology can be 
contested.  
Signs are the material which constitute ideologies. Thus, from a socio-
semiotic perspective, ideologies are products of linguistic work, that is, 
are signs organized according to a specific program; but, in this way, 
ideologies are also semiotic instruments with which interpreting and 
modelling the social world. Cultural identity constitute one of these 
instruments. 
 Cultural identity constitutes a sign systems, if you want, a system 
of categories,3 throw which a certain social group defines itself, 
distinguishing the others. As already said, it is impossible to subsume the 
plurality of sign systems which constitute a cultural identity under one 
                                                 
3 In this regard, see also Bourdieu, 1982.   
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category, especially if religion is such a category. This a reductio ad unum 
is, first of all, a theoretical error, that is, an error depending on a limited 
categorical construction: if we identify culture in its totality with the 
confessional sphere, we set up a lacking theoretical model; the previously 
mentioned mistake of multicultural approach.  On the contrary, 
we would like to demonstrate that another conception of culture is 
possible. If we maintain that multiculturalism could be replaced with an 
intercultural democracy, then we have to exceed the cultural model 
grounded in the logic of identity, assuming a different starting point: the 
concept of otherness characterizing the thought of the philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) (Ponzio, 1996).  
 
4.2. Ideo-logic of identity and logic of Otherness 
 
According to Ponzio, “the problem of otherness and the critique of 
identity as pivotal category of Occidental Reason are the central issue in 
the whole work of Emmanuel Levinas” (Ponzio, 2012b, p.17). 
Obviously, it is impossible to resume here the whole thought of one of 
the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Indeed, what I 
would like to do is – simply – starting from a fundamental assumption of 
his research: what unites every human being to another is a relation of 
reciprocal otherness (Levinas, 1961), that is, every human is other for 
another human: “that which unites each and every one of us to every 
other is otherness, which cannot be reduced to identity, whether of the 
individual or of the collectivity, which cannot be reduced to difference 
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connected to a genre of any sort. This condition of not belonging, of 
reciprocal strangeness is what unites us all in the relation of 
unindifference towards each other. No difference based on closed 
identity with its identity interests can cancel the essential condition of 
reciprocal strangeness, reciprocal otherness, as much as identity and 
identity interests may be indifferent to the difference of single 
individuals, as much as to other identity differences, to the very point of 
overpowering them” (Ponzio & Petrilli 2010, ). 
Developing the theories of Rossi-Landi and Levinas, Ponzio and Petrilli 
maintain that identity could be understood as an ideological category, 
namely, as a sign system organized according to a specific social design. 
Identity is then the result of a social process in which certain signs are set 
as standards, that go to make up sets of behavioural instructions related 
to specific social and cultural categories, such as,  for example: country 
(including some other specific connotations such as homeland, Western 
World, European Community, etc.), state, gender, ethnic group, class, 
and so on. More especially, these are concepts which connect the 
category of identity to the category of community, understood as 
collective identity: “every community identity has its own ‘extra-
communitarian’, an enemy against which community defends itself; the 
enemy is the other, that is, who is different from all the others which are 
parts of the community” (Ponzio, 1993, p.9). In the contemporary age, 
such a dynamic depends on the peculiar shape of capitalism.  
Through the notion of communication-production, Ponzio describes the 
present-day phase of development in the capitalist reproduction system, 
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that is, Globalization: “Production today is characterised by the industrial 
revolution of automation, globalisation of communication and 
universalisation of the market. Universalisation is not only a quantitative 
fact of expansion, but above all qualitative transformation represented by 
the fact that anything can be translated into merchandise. 
Communication today is no longer just an intermediate phase in the 
reproductive cycle (production, exchange, consumption). Far more 
radically, communication now represents the constitutive modality of 
production and consumption processes themselves. Not only does the 
exchange phase involve communication, but production and 
consumption as well converge with communication. So the whole 
reproductive cycle is communication. This phase in capitalist 
reproduction can be characterised as the ‘communication-production’ 
phase” (Ponzio & Petrilli, 2010). 
The predominant logic in today’s world  is the logic of Globalization, 
that is, the ideo-logic of communication-production (Ponzio, 1999), 
which represents the logic of identity in its most concrete form. This 
logic consists in measuring the deviation of individual differences from 
the standard norms connected with the above mentioned categories. 
Every excess – that is, everything departing from the logic of identity – is 
devalued, or in other words, is considered as not functional, or rather, as 
a possible dysfunction in the logic of identity. Never before has 
difference been given such a negative connotation. Reproduction of 
Identical is the purpose of communication-production system. 
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 What is being proposed on the basis of a reading of the authors 
mentioned is a different type of logic, that we define as logic of 
otherness (Ponzio, 2007). Such logic is grounded in the recognition of 
our need for the other, of the alien, of the stranger, because the presence 
of the other constitutes the logic of human language itself. According to 
the Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), every human 
linguistic phenomenon is dialogical, because every human sign 
presupposes the presence of the other. That is, of a person who is 
different from the subject generating  the sign. When we produce a sign 
we do it for another person, and, such a dialogism – for example – is 
evident also when we speak to ourselves: indeed, in this case, we speak 
(or rather, we think) with a certain intonation, that is, we use a specific 
linguistic device connoting a certain relation with someone else, for 
example a question, a refusal, a desire, an order and so on. The 
conclusion of such a thesis is that human thought is intrinsically 
dialogical: the other is always present in each and every one of our 
utterances, and, what is more, the  presence of the other is the condition 
itself for the utterance. Indeed, when we think, we think with a certain 
intonation, but we are not always aware of the subject to which the 
intonation is oriented (Ponzio, 1997, 2007; Ponzio & Petrilli, 2008).  
In the light of all these theories, now we can affirm that, from a semiotic 
perspective, the quality of being sign of something else could not be 
explained by the logic of identity: the otherness is an intrinsic 
characteristic of every sign. Without otherness we cannot have a sign, 
because as Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) affirms, a sign stat pro 
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aliquo. This is what Peirce defines as deferral, i.e, the property of 
deferring to another sign which acts as interpretant. As Petrilli maintains: 
“deferral among sign and interpretant is understood in the dialogical 
terms of question and answer: the interpretant responds to the sign, is an 
answer to it, an answer to the sign that presents itself as a question, 
which as such sets clear limits to interpretation, according to a dialogical 
relation that is open and at once tied to or restrained by the irreducible 
otherness of its terms” (Petrilli). The conclusion of  such a thesis could 
be that interpretation is impossible without different signs, and that the 
presence of the other represents an interrogation that is looking for 
answer. 
 
5.  Conclusions. Translation: a remedy against 
monoculturalism  
According to Petrilli, “as has often occurred in the course of history, 
presentday institutions coexist as integral parts of social life, which in 
fact derive from earlier economic, social and cultural systems with their 
stereotypes and ideologies. This is also true of such concepts as identity 
and difference together with the rules and regulations that accompany 
them. Translation (theory and practice) is implied in the question of 
identity and difference. And the risk translation runs these days is that of 
contributing to homogenizing identities and differences, linguistic and 
cultural identities and differences, of contributing to their negation and 
favouring the few with survival of not many more” (Petrilli & Ponzio, 
2010). 
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Dialectics between identity and otherness is, first of all, dialectics 
between different signs. On the one hand, signs make difference: indeed, 
every culture, by means of its (verbal and non-verbal) signs, distinguishes 
itself from the others, and affirms its identity. Social and cultural 
distinctions are distinctions made of and by signs; in this case – 
paradoxically –, difference means identity. But if we consider as a fact 
that different cultures produce different signs, and if we consider every 
sign as interpretable, then we also have to admit that intercultural 
translation is possible. From such a perspective, difference makes signs, 
and translation constitutes the semiotic process through which new sign 
systems could arise from the dialogical encounter among differences4: 
“all cultures may use signs to establish differences with respect to other 
cultures, to establish identities, to determine a culture’s identity and 
juxtapose it to others. On the other hand, all cultures may employ these 
differences to defer their signs as well as the signs of others. In this case 
cultures recognize the capacity for interrogative intonation (Bakhtin) in 
their signs. Insofar as they are signs such signs interrogate other 
interpretants, in turn signs, in turn a question in a dialogue. The dialogic 
dialectics of this type of interaction represents the only possibility of 
escape from relativism as well as from dogmatism, both expressions of 
the failure to recognize and the tendency to overpower the other” 
(Ponzio &Petrilli, 2010). 
                                                 
4 In this regard, see also Petrilli, 2007; 2010; 2012. 
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From such a perspective, otherness, in this case represented by the 
sociological category of interculturalism, could represent – as the Russian 
philosopher Michail Bachtin would  say – the interpretant of responsive 
understanding of Contemporaneity, that is, the sign which induces 
ourselves to interpret our identity through  new questions: “Translation, 
translation theory as much as translation practice, may be conceived as 
translation for others, reconstruction with others, and restitution to 
others of their difference non indifferent to the difference of others. In 
this way, translation can contribute to the possibility of planetary 
interconnection without closed communities. Instead of closed 
communities we must work for communities made of signs that are 
different, but without the signs of difference that make difference, 
without the signs of closed identities, without property, without 
territories, without ownership, without inequality, without roots” (Pozio 
& Petrilli 2010). 
Rather than closing ourselves in a community identity, opening to 
otherness together with responsive understanding and living the dialogic 
dimension of signs represents the new intercultural challenge for our 
contemporary world. 
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